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Abstract
The allocation of credit by banks and ﬁnancial institutions on ‘soft’ terms to friends and
relatives rather than on the basis of ‘hard’ market criteria in the years leading up to the East
Asian crisis of 1997-98 has been widely noted. Using a detailed dataset on Thai ﬁrms prior
to the crisis period we examine whether business connections were in fact a good predictor
of preferential access to long term bank credit. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms with connections to banks
and politicians had greater access to long-term debt than ﬁrms without such ties. Connected
ﬁrms need much less collateral to obtain long term loans than those without connections.
Such ﬁrms obtain more long term loans, and appear to use less short term loans. We do
not ﬁnd support for the existence of connections between banks and ﬁrms serving to reduce
asymmetric information problems. Our results thus lend support to the hypothesis that
the presence of connections was the most important factor determining access to long term
bank debt prior to the ﬁnancial crisis and are consistent with recent research implicating
weak corporate governance in the extent and severity of the crisis.
JEL Classiﬁcation: G30, G32
Keywords: Agency Costs, Capital Structure, Corporate Governance, Crony Capital, Debt
Maturity, East Asian Financial Crisis, Thailand.1 Introduction
The East Asian Crisis of 1997-98 has brought into sharp focus the distinctions between the
relationship-based economic and ﬁnancial system prevalent in many emerging economies and
the arms-length, market-driven system that mainly characterizes the developed economies of
Western Europe and North America. A number of recent studies on contracting in emerging
and transition economies (McMillan and Woodruﬀ (1999) and Johnson et al. (2002)) ﬁnd that
the reliance on relationships in these economies stems from inadequacies in formal institutions,
such as the legal system, that make arms-length contracting unreliable. If formal mechanisms of
governance are deﬁcient, informal mechanisms, such as the embedding of economic and ﬁnancial
transactions in a network of social relationships can be viewed as an endogenous response (Greif
(1993)).
But an emphasis on connections often goes hand-in-hand with a disregard for more objec-
tive approaches to decision making, implying a greater risk of agency problems. Corporate
governance can thus be a problem in economies with poor institutions (Shleifer and Vishny
(1997)). A number of recent papers have demonstrated the importance of corporate gover-
nance in emerging markets (La Porta et al. (1997 and 1998) and Johnson et al. (2000)). In
the context of the East Asian crisis, Johnson et al. (2000a) show that country speciﬁc measures
of corporate governance perform better than standard macroeconomic measures at explaining
the extent of currency depreciation and stock market decline of emerging markets during the
crisis. Mitton (2002) shows that corporate governance also explains cross-ﬁrm diﬀerences in
performance within countries during the crisis. Baek et al. (2003) also ﬁnd similar evidence on
Korea. Weak corporate governance practices in East Asia thus arguably made countries more
vulnerable to the crisis and exacerbated the crisis once it began.
In this paper we pursue this line of inquiry further by examining how actual business con-
nections determined access to bank credit in a prominent emerging economy, Thailand. The
allocation of credit by banks and ﬁnancial institutions on ‘soft’ terms to friends and relatives -
often termed cronyism - rather than on the basis of ‘hard’ market criteria in the years leading
up to the crisis has been widely noted (Krugman (1998), Corsetti et al. (1998a), Pomerleano
(1998)). But while the importance of such connections have been anecdotally accepted as an
endemic feature of emerging economies, empirical work linking close ties to preferential ﬁnance
1is scant1. The goal of this paper is to examine whether business connections are in fact a good
predictor of preferential access to long term credit using a detailed dataset on Thai ﬁrms prior
to the crisis period.
Standard theory suggests that in countries with poor corporate governance and inadequate
bankruptcy laws, banks ought to avoid lending long term. With a short-term loan contract,
banks gain a degree of control and can maintain a stronger bargaining position when renewing
the loan contracts (Diamond (1991b) and Rajan (1992)). Also, shorter maturities limit the
period over which an opportunistic ﬁrm can exploit its creditors without defaulting. In the
worse case, with short term debt, banks can pull their capital out at any indication of trouble
(Diamond and Rajan (2001)). However, ﬁrms might be able to access long term loans, which is
valuable in countries where the supply of funds is scarce, simply because they have established
strong ties with banks. Bank owners have incentives to provide such loans as they expect to
receive other private beneﬁts. Examples of these beneﬁts include the opportunities to maintain
other transactions with their debtors that are beneﬁcial to themselves and their privately owned
companies. Poor banking supervision as well as bank bail out policies facilitate lending via
connections.
Our empirical methodology, which we describe in section 4, attempts to examine whether
ﬁrms with connections have easier access to long term debt than ﬁrms without such ties. We
use a number of measures, such as aﬃliation to one of the 20, 30, and 60 largest Thai business
groups, and board linkages between banks and ﬁrms as proxies for ‘connections’. We ﬁnd that
these connections are by far the most important factor explaining access to long term debt.
Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that a host of standard ﬁrm characteristics that the current literature on
ﬁrm ﬁnancing suggests should be important in explaining easier access to debt play a much less
signiﬁcant role. Firms with connections need much less collateral to borrow long term than
those without connections. Such ﬁrms obtain more long term loans, and appear to use less short
term loans. We also examine whether the existence of connections between banks and ﬁrms
could be attributed to a desire to reduce moral hazard (monitoring) or adverse selection (private
information), and do not ﬁnd support for these explanations. Our results thus lend support
to the hypothesis that the presence of connections was the most important factor determining
access to long term bank debt prior to the ﬁnancial crisis. We also examine whether connected
ﬁrms were less vulnerable to the crisis of 1997 because they were able to obtain more long term
1We discuss some of the recent related work below.
2loans, were less levered and were consequently less credit constrained immediately following the
crisis. We ﬁnd some evidence for this. Section 5 discusses these results in more detail.
Our paper ﬁts into the new and growing literature that examines the impact of connections
on ﬁrm performance. The paper closest to our approach is La Porta et al. (2003). They
examine the beneﬁts of related lending using a newly assembled dataset on Mexico. They
ﬁnd that related lending is present in 20% of commercial loans and that it takes place on more
favorable terms than arms-length lending. They also ﬁnd that related loans are more likely to
default, and when they do, have signiﬁcantly lower recovery rates than unrelated loans. It is
noteworthy that our results for a diﬀerent emerging market, Thailand, are essentially consistent
with theirs.
Similar issues are also examined by Laeven (2001) using a dataset on bank-ﬁrm relationships
in Russia. Russian banks can make loans to ﬁrms that own substantial equity stakes in the bank.
His notion of connectedness is thus in terms of equity stakes and diﬀerent from the approach we
take here. In fact, lending to insiders in Thailand is proscribed by the Commercial Banking and
Finance Company Law. However, in line with our study, he also ﬁnds evidence of connections
in lending practices.
It is important to note that our study diﬀers from these papers in a number of substantive
ways. First, we construct explicit measures based on membership to politically connected busi-
ness groups and ﬁrm-bank board interlinkage that we feel capture the essence of connections.
Second, since our study focuses on an economy that is in the shadow of the East Asian crisis of
1997-98, we examine the link between connections and debt maturity. As borrowing practices
have been implicated in precipitating the crisis, our study could be considered valuable in terms
of forensic ﬁnancial evidence toward understanding the crisis (Johnson et al. (2000a)).
Recent papers by Fisman (2001) and Johnson and Mitton (2003) also examine the role of
political connections on ﬁrm performance in the context of emerging economies. Fisman (2001)
estimates the value of political connections in Indonesia by looking at how stock prices moved
when former President Suharto’s health was reported to change. Johnson and Mitton (2003)
examine the impact of connections in Malaysia by looking at the fall in the market value of
connected ﬁrms in the wake of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis and the subsequent reinstatement of
capital controls that diﬀerentially beneﬁted ﬁrms with connections. Both papers ﬁnd signiﬁcant
evidence for the value of connections.
Nor is the phenomenon restricted to emerging markets. Morck et al. (2000) show that
3established, well-connected ﬁrms in Canada (as measured by family inheritance of control) are
less eﬃcient and had negative abnormal stock returns when the 1998 Canada-U.S. free trade
agreement reduced barriers to foreign capital.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes our data sources
and sample characteristics. Section 3 provides an overview of the characteristics of ﬁrms in our
sample and the institutional background of the Thai banking system. Section 4 describes our
empirical methodology. Section 5 discusses our empirical results on connections and corporate
ﬁnancing. Section 6 provides robustness tests. Section 7 concludes.
2 Data Sources and Sample Characteristics
Our empirical strategy is geared toward investigating whether connections to ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries aﬀect the likelihood of access to preferential sources of long term loans. Our sample
contains data on 270 non-ﬁnancial companies listed in the Stock Exchange of Thailand in 1996.
This sample accounts for 97.08 percent of the market value of all non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Firms that
were excluded are those with insuﬃcient ﬁnancial data. In general, companies in the sample are
not just small or start-up companies. The average number of years since a ﬁrm was set up is
21.02 years. The sample includes both large companies and smaller size companies. The book
value of total assets varies from a maximum of 179,785 million Baht (7191.40 million USD) to a
minimum of 325.82 million Baht (13.03 million USD), with mean and median values of 7,140.71
million Baht (285.63 million USD) and 2,428.76 million Baht (97.15 million USD), respectively.
Based on Manager Information Services (1996)2, 22 companies in our sample appear in the
100 largest companies in Thailand in 1994. About 35.56 percent of companies in the sample
are among the largest 500 companies in Thailand. Approximately 77.78 percent of our sample
or 210 companies are in the top 2000 companies.
The data were manually collected from multiple sources. The main sources of data are
the FM 56-1 and the ISIM CD roms, which contains detailed company information required for
public disclosure by the Stock Exchange of Thailand. More precisely, this database provides data
for individual consolidated companies including ﬁnancial data, equity ownership, the board of
2Management Information Service (1996b) lists the 2000 largest companies in Thailand in 1994. The ranking
includes both publicly traded and private companies. This source of information is used because there is no
similar information available for 1996, and it is the closest data available to 1996. The rankings based on 1994
data probably do not provide exact information for the companies in our sample. Nevertheless, the rankings do
help to understand the characteristics of companies in our sample.
4directors, aﬃliated companies, and family relationships of major shareholders and management.
The FM 56-1 is in Thai and available at the library of the Stock Exchange of Thailand as well
as its website. The ISIM CD roms are also available at the Stock Exchange of Thailand.
We construct a unique database of ownership structure that enables us to trace ultimate
ownership. Previous research investigating ownership structure of East Asian ﬁrms namely,
Claessens et al. (2000 and 2002), Mitton (2002), Lemmon and Lins (2003), and Lins (2003)
typically employs data sources that include shareholders with holdings of at least 5 percent. Our
database, however, is more comprehensive in that it provides the information on shareholders
with holding of at least 0.5 percent. Moreover, with our database, we are able to trace the
ultimate owners of all privately owned companies that are the (domestic corporate) shareholders
of ﬁrms in our focus as well as family relationships between the major shareholders beyond
their surnames. More speciﬁcally, we also used various books both written in English (Suehiro
(1989) and Johnstone et al. (2002)) and in Thai (Pipatseritham (1981), Pornkulwat (1996), and
Sappaiboon (2000 and 2001)) in order to search for and trace the family relationships. With
this information, we are able to obtain the family trees for the top 150 largest family groups. In
addition, we have used the Business On Line (BOL) database published by the BusinessOnLine
Co., Ltd. to trace the ownership of private companies that are not disclosed in the FM 56-1.
The BOL databank includes major information of all registered companies in Thailand that is
reported annually to the Ministry of Commerce.
3 Institutional Background
This section provides a brief overview of the characteristics of Thai ﬁrms and the banking
system prior to the 1997 ﬁnancial crisis with a view toward highlighting the prevalence of
connections between banks and ﬁrms and some of the problems that could be associated with
such relationships. Section 3.1 describes the ownership and governance structures of Thai ﬁrms.
Section 3.2 is an outline of the historical development of the Thai banking system. Section 3.3
provides background on the interlinkage between connections, poor corporate governance and
bank crises.
53.1 The Thai Firms
Table 1 shows the ownership and governance structure of ﬁrms in our sample of 270 ﬁrms3.
The ownership calculation methodology is consistent with previous literature namely La Porta
et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2000), and Faccio and Lang (2002). The only diﬀerence is the
deﬁnition of controlling shareholder used here. Instead of the commonly used 20 percent cut-oﬀ
ownership level, we use the 25 percent cut-oﬀ when deﬁning the controlling shareholder here.
The choice of this cut-oﬀ is due to the Thai legal framework. Under Thai law, to have the
voting power to veto important corporate decisions, one needs to hold at least 75 percent of
the shares. Conversely, a shareholder with more than 25 percent stakes can eﬀectively control
a ﬁrm because then no other single shareholder would own enough voting rights to have the
absolute power over the ﬁrm to challenge him. (see Khantavit et al. (2003) for the discussion
on this issue).
For comparability, we also provide similar measures of ownership and governance variables
taken from Khantavit et al. (2003) whose sample include all listed ﬁrms in the Stock Exchange of
Thailand in 1996. Our results are quite similar to those of Khantavit et al. (2003). Speciﬁcally,
ownership is relatively concentrated. The mean cash ﬂow and voting rights held by the largest
blockholder of ﬁrms in our sample are about 39.58 percent and 42.68 percent, respectively. A
blockholder is deﬁned as a group of persons with the same family name, their close relatives as
well as companies that are owned and controlled by the same ultimate owner. This is consistent
with the ﬁndings of Claessens et al. (2000) that the ownership of Thai ﬁrms is the most
concentrated among the nine countries in East Asia.
In about 79.63 percent of the ﬁrms in our sample, the largest blockholder is a controlling
shareholder who holds at least 25 percent of the voting rights. Families predominate among
types of controlling shareholders. About 53.71 percent of the ﬁrms are controlled by a single
family. The second largest group is foreign investors who control about 13.33 percent of the
ﬁrms. Interestingly, our results indicate that about 10.37 percent of the ﬁrms are controlled
by multiple controlling shareholders. These controlling shareholders do not simply control the
ﬁrms but are often involved in management as oﬃcers and directors. This occurs in about two-
third of the ﬁrms. In contrast, management that is not from the controlling shareholder family
holds relatively small stakes of the ﬁrms. On average, executive and non executive directors
own about 1.75 percent and 3.24 percent of the shares, respectively.
3For more detail discussion see Wiwattanakantang (2001b) and Khantavit et al. (2003)
6In contrast to many emerging economies, complicated ownership structures such as cross-
shareholdings and pyramids are not commonly used by the controlling shareholders to control
the ﬁrms. Accordingly, the ratio of cash ﬂow and voting rights is only 0.93, indicating that the
degree of the separation between ownership and control is small.
Due to diﬀerences in the sample ﬁrms4 and the deﬁnitions of controlling shareholder, our
results are not directly comparable to those of Claessens et al. (2000) shown in Column (3).
Therefore, in order to facilitate comparability, we match their data with ours ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm and
exclude ﬁnancial ﬁrms that are in their sample. The results based on the database of Claessens
et al. (2000) and ours are shown in Column (4) and (5), respectively. The samples in the
Column (4) and (5) are based on 108 non ﬁnancial ﬁrms. The ownership cut-oﬀ used to deﬁne
the controlling shareholder is 25 percent.
In general, the results are similar in that the ownership is relatively concentrated, and fam-
ilies dominate other types of controlling shareholders. However, the ownership variables based
on the database of Claessens et al. (2000) are lower than our calculations. For example, cal-
culations based on our database show that the mean cash ﬂow and voting rights of the largest
shareholder are 40.35 and 42.52, respectively. The results based on the database of Claessens
et al. (2000) show that the mean cash ﬂow and voting rights of the largest shareholder are
only 36.87 and 38.96, respectively. When using the 25 percent cut-oﬀ to deﬁne the controlling
shareholder, we ﬁnd that about 79.6 percent of the ﬁrms have at least one controlling share-
holder, while the results based on the database of Claessens et al. (2000) show that about 85.2
of the ﬁrms fall into this category. In addition, we ﬁnd about 25.9 percent of the ﬁrms use
pyramids, while the results based on the database of Claessens et al. (2000) indicate only about
6.5 percent of these ﬁrms.
We believe that the results based on the database of Claessens et al. (2000) underestimate
the ownership of Thai ﬁrms and are probably attributable to the following reasons. First,
Claessens et al. (2000) employ data sources that include shareholders with shareholdings of at
least 5 percent, while our database includes those with shareholdings of at least 0.5 percent.
Second, we are able to trace ultimate ownership of privately held ﬁrms that are in the middle
of the chain of the control. We ﬁnd that on average, the shares of about 27 percent of the ﬁrms
in our full sample are held via privately owned companies. Without tracing the ownership of
4The sample of Claessens et al. (2000) includes both ﬁnancial and non ﬁnancial ﬁrms, while ours do not
include non ﬁnancial ﬁrms. In addition, while the number of ﬁrms in our sample includes about 76.7 percent of
non-ﬁnancial listed ﬁrms, their sample covers only 36.78 percent of all listed companies.
7these private companies, one would underestimate the actual cash-ﬂow and control rights held
by the controlling shareholders. We also question their results regarding the number of ﬁrms
that are controlled by widely held ﬁrms. More precisely, while they ﬁnd about 15.7 percent of
the ﬁrms are held by widely held ﬁrms, we ﬁnd no such ﬁrms. Firms might have been classiﬁed
as widely held simply because Claessens et al. (2000) could not trace their ultimate ownership.
Third, Claessens et al. (2000) trace family relationships based only on family names, while we
are able to include the in-laws as well.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
3.2 The Thai Banking System
As of 1996, the Thai ﬁnancial system consisted of 29 commercial banks (14 of which were
branches of foreign banks); 91 ﬁnance companies; and 12 credit foncier companies; 7 specialized
state-owned banks; 15 insurance companies; 880 private provident funds; and 8 mutual fund
management companies. Total assets of the system amounted to the equivalent of 190 percent
of GDP. Commercial banks alone accounted for 64 percent of the total assets, while ﬁnance
companies accounted for 20 percent of the total assets, and state-owned specialized banks
accounted for a further 10 percent. Domestic banks were by far more important than foreign
banks. For example, loans made by domestic commercial banks account for about 103.9 percent
of GDP as of the end of 1997 (in which the data is available), while those of foreign banks were
only about 22 percent of GDP.
Fifteen domestic commercial banks and 52 ﬁnance companies were listed in the Stock Ex-
change of Thailand, most of which were owned or controlled by family-based business groups.
Speciﬁcally, Anuchitworawong et al. (2003) show that out of the 15 banks, 13 banks were
controlled either by a single family or multiple families. The two remaining banks were state
owned. Similarly, families controlled 80 percent of ﬁnance companies. Interestingly, the largest
blockholder held large stakes even though the Thai Commercial Bank Act B.E. 2505 limits a
person’s holding at no more than 5 and 10 percent of the outstanding shares of a commercial
bank and ﬁnance companies, respectively. This happened even though the controlling family
did not violate the law. Anuchitworawong et al. (2003) ﬁnd that the structure of shareholdings
were arranged to be complicated in such a way that the control was via many (both private
and public) companies. Each of these companies held the number of shares that were allowed
8by the law. Thus on the surface, all the banks and ﬁnance companies appear as widely held.
Anuchitworawong et al. (2003), however, show that the average (median) shareholdings by the
largest blockholder of banks and ﬁnance companies are 23.23 (25.15) percent and 29.77 (28.42)
percent, respectively.
Most Thai banks were founded by overseas Chinese during 1930-1950 with the purpose of
channeling funding to their own businesses (Bualek (2000)). Out of 20 commercial banks that
were established during this period, 14 banks were founded by overseas Chinese families 5. The
remaining six banks were founded by the Crown Property Bureau6. As of 1996, the founding
families retained control over these six banks. Several bank failures, mergers and acquisitions
occurred over the past four decades and as a result some founding families have lost control
over their banks and new families have taken their place.
Finance and securities companies were ﬁrst established in 1969. The number of ﬁnance
companies grew rapidly during the 1970s from 17 in 1971 to 118 in 1979, when foreign and
local banks set up such companies to avoid the moratorium on new banking licenses imposed
by the Thai cabinet in mid 1970s, and to avoid the maximum interest rate and credit controls
imposed on commercial banks. By the end of 1987, 26 out of the 93 ﬁnance companies were
aﬃliated with privately held Thai commercial banks, and a further 12 were aﬃliated with the
state owned Krung Thai Bank.
The top four family owned banks in 1996 were the Bangkok Bank, the Thai Farmers Bank,
the Siam Commercial Bank, and the Bank of Ayudhaya, that were controlled by Sophonpanich,
Crown Property Bureau, Lamsam, and Rattanarak, respectively. These four banks accounted
for about 54.44 percent of total assets of all commercial banks7. These four families also
controlled 15 ﬁnance companies that accounted for about 33.09 percent of all ﬁnance companies.
In part because of regulations and in part because of marriage ties between the controlling
families, the Thai ﬁnancial system exhibited an increasingly oligopolistic structure over a long
5These families are the Cholvicharn and Phenchart (Union Bank of Bangkok, 1949), Euachukiarti and Kan-
tamanond (Bank of Asia, 1939), Euawatanaskul (Bangkok Metropolitan Bank, 1950), Kanchanapat (Siam City
Bank, 1941), First Bangkok City Bank, 1960), Lamsam (Thai Farmers Bank, 1945), Nandhabivat (Laemthong
Bank, 1948), Rattanarak (Bank of Ayudhya, 1945), Sophonpanich (Bangkok Bank, 1944), Tarnvanichkul (Asia
Trust Bank, 1965), Tejapaibul (Bank of Asia, 1939, Bangkok Metropolitan Bank, 1950, and First Bangkok City
Bank, 1960), and Wang Lee (Nakornthon Bank, 1933).
6The Crown Property Bureau is the founder of the following banks: Siam Commercial Bank (1906), Siam City
Bank (1941), Krung Thai Bank (1966), Thai Dhanu Bank (1949), Nokornthon Bank (1933), and Thai Farmers
Bank (1945).
7Note that the top three largest banks in 1996 were the Bangkok Bank, the Thai Farmers Bank, and the
government-owned Krung Thai Bank. These top three banks accounted for about 49.70 percent of total assets
of commercial banks.
9period of time until the ﬁnancial crisis.
The big banks owner families expanded their banking businesses and established virtual
control not only over other ﬁnancial institutions but also a wide array of economic activities
since the 1970s. For example, the Sophonpanich family not only owned the Bangkok Bank,
but also owned 5 ﬁnance companies, 6 insurance companies, and had large interests in rice
trading, rice milling, warehousing, textiles, vehicle assembly, restaurants, real estate, cement,
tin, soft drinks, iron and steel, and plastics (Hewison (1989)). In addition, these families also
had substantial inﬂuence over other corporations through lending. The expansion of ownership
and control over the banking industry as well as other sectors by the big banking and industrial
families could be considered a unique characteristic of Thai capitalism.
3.3 Connections, Corporate Governance, and the Banking Crises
Extensive anecdotal evidence suggests that these inﬂuential families maintained banks and
ﬁnance companies as oﬀ-shoots of their businesses. Consequently, local Thai banks appeared
to extend loans based on personal ties and collateral but not on the basis of expected future
cash-ﬂow. On several instances these mis-allocated loans bankrupted the banks because the
loans were concentrated among only a few well connected inﬂuential families who eventually
defaulted. For example, Thanapornpun (1999) describes how in 1986 the Krung Thai bank
allocated a large amount of loans to the Srikrungwattana group, Pol Rengprasertwit, and Sura
Chansrichawala families on preferential terms.
One of the most notorious cases concerns the lending practices of the Bangkok Bank of
Commerce (BBC), a medium sized bank, during the ﬁrst half of the 1990s. The bank allegedly
granted a very large amount of loans to ﬁrms that were aﬃliated to Rajan Pillai, Rages Sakdina,
Adnan Khashoggi and Suchat Thanchareon, who were close friends of the bank’s president and
major shareholder, Krirk-kiat Jalichandra. The bank collapsed in 1996 and the president was
not only dismissed but also charged by the Thai Economic Crime Suppression Division for
embezzling USD 66.3 million from the bank and extending huge loans beyond his authority.
The BBC could be considered the ﬁrst bank to succumb to problems arising from poor lending
practices, a pattern that other ﬁnancial institutions eventually displayed and which developed
into the 1997 banking crisis8.
8An examination of issues related to expropriation of minority shareholders is beyond the scope of this paper,
but Johnson et al. (2000) is a relevant reference here.
10Poor bank supervision and examination has also been hand-in-glove with the prevalence
of connections. The Bank of Thailand (BOT) has punished neither ﬁnancial institutions nor
executives for lending to risky projects that led to non-performing loans. These issues are
acknowledged in the Nukul Commission Report9. According to the report on the BBC issue,
the BOT failed to detect that the problems with non performing loans since 1991 were serious
and needed to be solved urgently. Hence, the BOT did not take appropriate actions which
should have included replacing the incumbent management of the bank and reducing its capital.
The BOT recognized the BBC problem when it was too late and there was a run on bank deposits
in 1996.
4 Empirical Methods
Previous studies document that close ties to banks beneﬁt ﬁrms in several ways. For example,
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) ﬁnd that Japanese manufacturing ﬁrms that have strong relation-
ships with their main banks tended to use more capital than independent ﬁrms in the same
industry when their operating cash ﬂow declined during the period 1977-86. In many emerging
economies, close ties to banks also provide opportunities for ﬁrms to obtain economic rents
created by various regulations to promote some speciﬁc industries. For example, in Thailand
banks were required to provide loans at lower than the market rate to the agribusiness industry
in the 1980s. Anecdotal evidence exists of ﬁrms with close ties to banks receiving most of these
loans. In Korea until the end of the 1980s, banks were required by the government to lend to
large family-owned business groups (Chaebols) at low interest rates. Lee et al. (2000) ﬁnd that
Chaebol aﬃliated ﬁrms are in fact more levered than stand alone ﬁrms.
In this paper, we argue that strong connections with banks and ﬁnance companies provide
ﬁrms preferential access to long term loans. To test this argument, we use the standard corporate
ﬁnance model of the determinants of debt maturity following Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs
and Mauer (1996) and Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999). Speciﬁcally, we estimate a
measure of long term loans as a function of measures of connection and control variables. As
a proxy for long term loans, we use the ratio of long term borrowings from banks and ﬁnance
9This report was prepared for the government in 1998, and was published in English and Thai. The objective
was to identify the causes of economic and mis-management and corruption in the Bank of Thailand. It provides
recommendations to improve the eﬃciency of the ﬁnancial system and reforms of the BOT. The chairman of
the commission was Nukul Prachuabmoh, a former governor of the BOT. Other members include several of the
country’s leading economists and lawyers.
11companies to total debt. Total debt includes short term and long term debt from banks and
other ﬁnancial intermediaries, long term debt that is due in the current period, and debentures.
4.1 Connections with Banks
We deﬁne a ﬁrm as having “close connections” to banks when the ﬁrm is owned by the country’s
richest families. In other words, we believe that the country’s richest families that own business
empires are well connected to bankers. (Hereafter we use the word ‘bank’ as an abbreviation
for ﬁnancial institutions. It includes both banks and ﬁnance companies.) In addition, as
several authors have also noted (Khanna (2000), Bongini et al. (2001), Chui et al. (2001), and
Fisman (2001)) in emerging market contexts, a country’s rich families are known to be strongly
connected not only to ﬁnancial institutions but also the power structure. Thailand certainly is
not an exception.
For the “connected families” to be a good indicator of the strong connections with banks,
the proxy for the “connected families” should include the most wealthy and well known fam-
ilies. Similar to many emerging economies, identifying the richest families in Thailand is not
straightforward because there is no oﬃcial record on the ranking of business groups. The rank-
ing could be perfectly done if all the ﬁrms were listed in the stock exchange. Unfortunately, this
is not the case in many emerging economies including Thailand. Thus only a rough estimation
can be done. Speciﬁcally, to rank the wealth, we employ the business group ranking done by
Suehiro (2000). This ranking focuses on ﬁrms that appear in the largest thousand ﬁrms in 1994
published by the Advanced Research Group. To obtain the size of a group, he sums up sales of
all ﬁrms in the same group. The information on aﬃliated ﬁrms is obtained from the Ministry
of Commerce and Tara Siam Business Information (1996).
Based on this information, we deﬁne “connected families” to be the owners of the 20, 30,
and 60 largest business groups that are shown in Table 2. We use three levels of wealth to
measure the strength of the connections. The size of the top 60 business groups, measured by
sales, ranges from 122, 039 million Baht to 6,241 million Baht (see Suehiro (2000)).
As shown by the family names, business groups proxy the close ties that the controlling
families have with banks. In fact, a number of these families, for example the Crown Prop-
erty Bureau, Lamsam, Rattanarak, Sophonpanich, Taechaphibun, and Wang Lee, did own and
control banks, ﬁnance and insurance companies until the ﬁnancial crisis hit in 1997 (see Anu-
chitworawong et al. (2003)). Some of the connected families are connected to the owners of
12banks by marriage. For example, members of the Sophonpanich which has been the largest
shareholder of the largest bank in Thailand, the Bangkok Bank, married to the Leesawattrakun
and Srifuangfung families. The Lamsam family which has been the largest shareholder of the
Thai Farmer Bank, the third largest bank as of the end of 1996, is also tied to the Wang Lee,
the Yip In Tsoi, and the Chutrakul by marriage for more than one generation.
We deﬁne ﬁrms as connected to these connected families if any of these families own at least
a 10 percent stake in the ﬁrms 10. Our results show that 22.22 percent, 26.30 percent and 32.96
percent of ﬁrms in our sample are aﬃliated to the top 20, 30 and 60 connected families (see
Table 3). About 11.48 percent of the sample are those in which the controlling shareholders are
the major shareholders of banks and ﬁnance companies.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
4.2 Control Variables
Previous studies suggest that since it is diﬃcult to monitor ﬁrms due to a high degree of
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, investors are likely to depend more on
short term loans (Barclay and Smith (1995), Houston and James (1996), and Stohs and Mauer
(1996)). Diamond (1991a) argues that low quality ﬁrms that have insuﬃcient cash ﬂows have
no choice but to resort to short term debt. These ﬁrms are discouraged from using long term
debt because they have low credit ratings, and hence bear higher interest costs. As low rated
ﬁrms are not able to participate in the directly placed long-term debt market, they end up
borrowing short term from banks and ﬁnance companies.
Following the literature, we include ﬁve variables to control for ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics.
First, we include the natural logarithm of assets (Log (assets)) as a measure of ﬁrm size. Size
might be positively associated with reputation as well as the level of the ﬁrm speciﬁc information
that is disclosed to public (Diamond (1991b)). Also, larger ﬁrms are likely to be more diversiﬁed
and hence have less chance of going into ﬁnancial distress than smaller ﬁrms. Accordingly, ﬁrm
size is likely to be positively correlated with the level of long term debt.
Second, we include the ratio of the market to the book value of total assets (M-B ratio) as
a proxy for future investment opportunities. The market value of assets is deﬁned as the book
10According to the Thai corporate law, with this level of shareholdings, a shareholder can control the ﬁrm in
the following manner. He has the right to submit a motion to the court for the company’s liquidation if, ( i.)
management fails to act in accordance with the provisions relating to payments of stock issuance and transferring
of ownership, (ii.) the number of shareholders is less than 15, and (iii.) the company is in ﬁnancial distress and
has no possibility of recovering (see Stock Exchange of Thailand (1997) and Wiwattanakantang (2001b)).
13value of assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. The literature
on debt maturity suggests that ﬁrms with high growth prospects are susceptible to both under
as well as over investment problems. Short term debt might mitigate these problems since the
debt contract comes up for negotiation before completion of the projects. Hence the creditors
can monitor the operation and investment decisions of the ﬁrms. Thus we predict a negative
relation between growth opportunities and long term debt.
Third, we also include the ratio of net ﬁxed assets to total assets (Fixed asset ratio) in the
model to capture the eﬀect of collateral on the use of long term loans. The ﬁxed asset ratio
can also be used to control for the maturity matching eﬀect on ﬁnancial structure. Stohs and
Mauer (1996) and Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) argue that ﬁrms are more likely to
choose debt maturity in order to match the maturity of borrowing with the maturity of their
assets. Therefore, ﬁrms tend to need more long term funding to ﬁnance their investment in
ﬁxed assets.
Fourth, we include the standard deviation of the percentage changes in sales over the period
1991-1995 S.D. (sales 1992-95) to control for the volatility of earning. The volatility of earning
is positively related to the level of the asymmetric information problem the ﬁrm faces when
trying to acquire long term loans. We expect that higher risk ﬁrms are likely to have diﬃculty
obtaining long term debt.
Finally, we include a measure of leverage deﬁned as the ratio of total liabilities to total
assets to control for the probability of being in ﬁnancial distress. Firms with high probability
of default are likely to have a greater likelihood of ﬁnancial troubles. These high default risk
ﬁrms are likely to be have diﬃculty obtaining long term debt since creditors would require high
interest rates for bearing the long term credit risk.
To capture the variation in borrowing decisions due to industry characteristics, we include
21 dummy variables representing ﬁrms in the 21 industries that are classiﬁed by the Stock
Exchange of Thailand. The remaining industry is the agribusiness industry.
5 Empirical Evidence: Connections and Corporate Financing
5.1 Univariate Analysis
We begin our analysis by comparing the pattern of ﬁnancing structure and ﬁrms characteristics
between ﬁrms with and without bank connections. Table 3 compares mean values of a set of
14variables of ﬁrms that are connected to the most wealthy families and those that are not. As
hypothesized, connected ﬁrms tend to have relatively more long term loans. Connected ﬁrms
appear to use less short term loans relative to non connected ﬁrms, however. Speciﬁcally, while
the mean ratio of long term loans to total assets for ﬁrms aﬃliated to the most wealthy families
is about 15 percent, those of non connected ﬁrms is about 12 percent. Similarly, while the mean
ratio of long term loans to total debt for connected ﬁrm ranges between 34-36 percent, that of
non connected ﬁrms is only about 26 percent. The diﬀerences are signiﬁcant at the conventional
levels.
When considering the overall debt level, connected ﬁrms turn out to be similar to non
connected ﬁrms. But interestingly, when we limit the rich level to the top 20 and 30, connected
ﬁrms appear to have signiﬁcantly less overall debt when compared to non connected ﬁrms. The
diﬀerences in both mean and median values are strong signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
We investigate further by testing whether diﬀerences in the use of long term loans between
connected and non connected ﬁrms are attributable to the diﬀerences in the ﬁrm characteris-
tics factors. When compared to non-connected ﬁrms, connected ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly larger
measured by assets and sales. Firm connected to the top 30 and 60 families have signiﬁcantly
higher growth ratios compared to non connected ﬁrms. However, connected and non-connected
ﬁrms do not appear to be diﬀerent in terms of proﬁtability, tangible assets, and ﬁnancial risk
level (as measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets). This preliminary investigation
provides some support for our conjecture that close relationships with ﬁnancial institutions do
matter in facilitating more long term lending. In the next section, we investigate this issue in
more detail using multivariate analysis.
[Insert Table 3 here]
5.2 Connections and Long Term Loans
We ﬁrst analyze whether ﬁrms aﬃliated to the richest families which are postulated as having
close ties to banks obtain relatively more long term loans. Table 4 contains the OLS regression
results. All regressions include industry eﬀects. In Speciﬁcation (1) and (2), we present the
regression results for ﬁrms that are aﬃliated to the 60 most wealthy families, which is indicated
by a dummy variable Connected ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, the dummy variable is one if the ﬁrm is
owned by the 60 families documented in Section 4.1. The results in Speciﬁcation (1) in which
15no ﬁrm characteristic factors are included strongly supports the univariate tests. The estimated
coeﬃcient on Connected ﬁrms is positive and strongly signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. The
magnitude of the coeﬃcient indicates that ﬁrms aﬃliated to the top 60 most wealthy families
have, on average, a higher ratio of long term debt to total debt of 9.2 percent. The results hold
when all the control variables are included (Speciﬁcation (2)). The estimated coeﬃcient on
Connected ﬁrms shows that these connected ﬁrms on average have 6.1 percent more long term
debt than non connected ﬁrms. Hence, the empirical evidence strongly supports our hypothesis
that close personal ties provide greater access to long term borrowing from banks and ﬁnance
companies.
To test whether the level of wealth aﬀects the results, we redeﬁne the dummy Connected
ﬁrms. In Speciﬁcation (3)-(4), Connected ﬁrms represent ﬁrms that belong to the top 30 most
wealthy families. In Speciﬁcation (5)-(6), Connected ﬁrms represent ﬁrms that belong to the top
20 most wealthy families. In all these four regressions, the estimated coeﬃcients on Connected
ﬁrms are strongly signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. The results are consistent with the previous
ﬁndings that connected ﬁrms use more long term loans. In addition, the results indicate that
the levels of wealth of the major shareholders are positively related to the long term loans ratio.
Speciﬁcally, the long term loan ratio of ﬁrms belonging to the top 30 most wealthy families
are 10.5 percent higher than non connected ﬁrms. When the benchmark is raised to the top
20 richest families, the estimated coeﬃcient on Connected ﬁrms is slightly higher to be 10.7
implying that connected ﬁrms use 10.7 percent more long term loans than non connected ﬁrms.
Regarding the eﬀects of ﬁrm characteristics on the choices of long term borrowing, in general
the results support the hypothesis that ﬁrms with high agency costs are likely to use less long
term bank debt. But, somewhat surprisingly, the coeﬃcient estimates associated with only two
ﬁrm characteristics factors are signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcients on ﬁrm size and the ﬁxed asset ratio
are consistently signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level in all models. These results indicate that ﬁrm
size and type of assets do matter in extending debt maturity. Large ﬁrms have more access
to long term loans probably because they have smaller information asymmetries or are more
diversiﬁed. The results also suggest that ﬁrms may use their tangible assets as collateral to
support long term loans.
However, besides size and tangible assets, other ﬁrm characteristics that are usually found to
be empirically important determinants of debt maturity structure in more developed economies
such as the U.S. do not appear to have any signiﬁcant eﬀect on long term borrowing of Thai
16ﬁrms. The lack of signiﬁcance of other variables in our regressions implies that institutional
and structural frameworks matter in determining debt maturity structure.
The results of the ﬁtness test are satisfactory. F-statistics indicate that all these regressions
are signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. The values of adjusted R-squared range from 0.27 to 0.38
suggest that our models provide a good explanatory power of the debt maturity structure of
Thai ﬁrms.
[Insert Table 4 Here]
5.3 How Do Connections Work?
We extend the analysis to investigate how the relationships work to enable ﬁrms to raise more
long term loans. More precisely, we analyze whether the relationships overwhelm the eﬀects of
ﬁrm characteristics on the decisions of long term loans. For example, the debt maturity literature
suggests that ﬁrms should match the maturity structures of their assets and ﬁnancing, hence
ﬁrms with less ﬁxed assets should be associated with less long term loans. However, the ﬁxed
asset eﬀect on the choices of long term loans might be attenuated or disappear if ﬁrms have
strong connections with banks. In this section, we attempt to shed light on these issues.
To test this issue, we need to simultaneously incorporate connection and ﬁrm characteristic
variables. We re-estimate the regressions including the interaction terms between ﬁrm-bank
connection variables and ﬁrm characteristics. The coeﬃcient on a given interaction term mea-
sures how the relation between the choice of long term debt and the relevant ﬁrm characteristic
diﬀers for ﬁrms with and without close connections. If the connections overwhelm the eﬀects
of ﬁrm characteristics on the decisions of long term loans, then the estimated coeﬃcient on an
interaction variable for a ﬁrm characteristic should be opposite in sign from the non-interaction
term.
The results of the regression are presented in Table 5. In columns (1), (2), and (3), the ﬁrm
characteristics are interacted with the dummy variables, Connected ﬁrms, which represent ﬁrms
belonging to the top 60, 30 and 20 richest families, respectively. Only the estimated coeﬃcients
on the interaction terms between the ﬁxed asset ratio and the dummy variable, connected ﬁrms
are statistically signiﬁcant. While the coeﬃcients on the ﬁxed asset ratio are positive and
consistently signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level in all regressions, the estimated coeﬃcients on the
interaction terms between the ﬁxed asset ratio and the dummy variable, Connected ﬁrms, turn
17out to be signiﬁcantly negative in all regressions at the 1 percent level. This evidence suggests
the relatively more importance of collateral for long term ﬁnancing in non connected ﬁrms. In
contrast, connected ﬁrms appear to use much less collateral when borrowing long term. For
example, in Speciﬁcation (1), for non connected ﬁrms, the economic eﬀect of ﬁxed assets on
long term borrowing are a dramatic 43.6 percent, the ﬁxed assets eﬀects in ﬁrms belonging to
the top 60 richest families are only 3.86 percent.
However, these results could also suggest a diﬀerent interpretation along the following lines.
The negative coeﬃcient on the interaction term implies that when compared to non connected
ﬁrms, connected ﬁrms appear to match the maturity of their debt to assets to a lesser degree.
Regardless of how the results are interpreted, these ﬁndings provide stronger support for the
connected lending hypothesis.
[Insert Table 5 Here]
5.4 Further Results: Connections and Total Debt
In this Section, we test whether the connections have any eﬀects on the use of total debt. For the
robustness check, we run the regressions with and without control variables that capture ﬁrm
characteristics. The choices of ﬁrm characteristic variables are based on the capital structure
literature e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Booth et al. (2001). Speciﬁcally, we include 5
ﬁrm characteristic variables namely the logarithm of assets, the market to the book value of
total assets, the ﬁxed asset ratio, the standard deviation of the percentage changes in sales over
the period 1991-1995, and the ratio of EBIT to total assets to control for the eﬀects of size,
investment opportunities, tangibility, business risk, and proﬁtability, respectively.
The regression results are shown in Table 6. The adjusted R-squared range varies from 19.4
percent to 21 percent in the models before the ﬁrm characteristic variables are not included and
rises to 44.4 percent to 46 percent with the control variables.
The estimated coeﬃcients on all the three connection variables representing ﬁrms belonging
to the top 60, 30, and 20 richest families turn out to be negative in all the models. The estimated
coeﬃcients on the connection variables are strongly signiﬁcant in almost all the models except
in Speciﬁcation (1) in which the connection variable representing ﬁrms belonging to the top 60
richest families is included and there is no control variable. The results indicate that connected
ﬁrms use less total debt. Interestingly, the magnitude of the coeﬃcients on the connection
18variables suggest that the wealth of the ﬁrms’ major shareholders is negatively related to the
total debt ratio. The richer the major shareholders of the ﬁrms are, the less the ﬁrms are
levered. Statistically, while ﬁrm aﬃliated to the 60 richest families have, on average, a lower
debt/asset ratio of 5.9 percent when compared to non connected ﬁrms, aﬃliations to the 20
and 30 richest families have, on average, lower debt/asset ratios of 8.5 percent and 8.6 percent,
respectively.
Our results indicate that by having connections with banks, ﬁrms can get more long term
loans, and appear to use less short term loans (see also Table 3). The fall in total debt ratios
indicate that the substitution of short term debt for long term debt is less than one.
Our ﬁndings do not support the view often made by many studies in the ﬁnancial crisis
literature that crony relationship is associated with a higher leverage ratio. Apparently, this is
not the case for listed ﬁrms in Thailand. In fact, Lee et al. (2000) also document similar results
that ﬁrms aﬃliated to the top ﬁve largest chaebols do not have higher debt/asset ratios than
non chaebol ﬁrms during 1989-1997.
[Insert Table 6 Here]
5.5 Are Connected Firms less Vulnerable to the Financial Crisis?
In this Section, we investigate the impact of ﬁnancial crisis that hit Thailand in July 1997
on ﬁrms connected to the rich. More precisely, we test whether connected ﬁrms were less
vulnerable to the adverse economic shocks because connected ﬁrms could obtain more long term
loans and were less levered. By being more dependent on long term loans and hence having
higher capacity to secure external ﬁnance, connected ﬁrms should be less ﬁnancial constrained
during the ﬁnancial crisis when the country experienced severe credit crunch. In contrast, non
connected ﬁrms that used more short term loans might suﬀer more from the economic shock
because they might have been in trouble ﬁnding alternative sources of funding. In fact, Bae
et al. (2002) ﬁnd a sharp decline in performance of ﬁrms in Korea that could not switch to new
lenders after the crisis hit. In addition, Opler and Titman (1994) and Baek et al. (2002) ﬁnd
that highly levered ﬁrms experience large drop in ﬁrm’s value during the period of economic
downturn.
Following the literature (e.g., Mitton (2002) and Lemmon and Lins (2003)), we focus on the
period immediately after the ﬁnancial crisis, the end of 1997, in order to isolate other factors
19that might aﬀect the degree of vulnerability and hence correctly capture the connection eﬀects.
We measure the degree of vulnerability by using two measures: the interest coverage ratio and
the ratio of earnings before taxes to total assets (EBT/assets). The interest coverage ratio is
commonly used to deﬁne ﬁnancial distress (e.g., Asquith et al. (1994) and Andrade and Kaplan
(1998)) and is deﬁned as the ratio of interest expenses to earnings before interest and taxes.
The results are shown in Table 7. We report the median values because the interest coverage
ratios include extreme values. Because some of the ﬁrms in the 1996 sample were delisted in
1997, we end up having less ﬁrms in the 1997 sample.
The results indicate that connected ﬁrms appeared to be relatively less vulnerable to the
crisis. The median coverage ratios for the ﬁrms connected to the top 60, 30 and 20 richest
families are 1.47, 1.54, and 1.63, respectively, implying that these ﬁrms still had some slack
after paying the interest expenses. In contrast, the median coverage ratios for non connected
ﬁrms which range between 1.04 to 1.15 are lower than those of connected ﬁrms. The diﬀerences
in the median values are statistical signiﬁcant only for ﬁrms that belong to the top 20 and 30
families, however.
Next, we count the number of ﬁrms in each group that have an interest coverage ratio less
than one, indicating that the business is having diﬃculties generating the cash necessary to
pay its interest obligations. Statistically, connected ﬁrms experience ﬁnancial distress less often
than non connected ﬁrms. For example, while about 38.57 percent of ﬁrms connected to the
top 30 families were having ﬁnancial diﬃculties, about 47.96 percent of non connected ﬁrms are
in the same boat.
For the robustness, we use an alternative measure of performance, the ratio of earnings
before taxes to total assets (EBT/assets). Similarly, we ﬁnd that connected ﬁrms have sig-
niﬁcant higher proﬁtability after paying interest expenses. Further, we run regressions of the
performance variable (EBT/assets) on the connected ﬁrm dummy variable and control for the
industry eﬀects. In addition, we include two ﬁrm characteristic variables to control for the
eﬀects of ﬁrm size and leverage. The results are shown in Table 8. When ﬁrm characteristic
variables are not included, estimated coeﬃcients on the dummy variables, Connected ﬁrms, are
strongly signiﬁcantly in all the models indicating that connected ﬁrms had higher net proﬁt
when compared to non connected ﬁrms. However when the ﬁrm characteristic variables are
not included, only the coeﬃcient on the dummy variable, Connected ﬁrms, that represent ﬁrms
connected to the top 20 families turns out to be statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
20The magnitude of the coeﬃcient indicates that ﬁrms connected to the top 20 families had, on
average, a higher EBT/assets of 4 percent over the period immediately after being hit by the
crisis.
Overall the results indicate that ﬁrms aﬃliated to the rich in particular the top 20 most
richest families are less vulnerable to the 1997 crisis. Our analysis is consistent with the ﬁndings
of Johnson et al. (2002), Mitton (2002), Lemmon and Lins (2003), and Baek et al. (2003). The
focuses are slightly diﬀerent , however. While they investigate the eﬀects of corporate governance
namely disclosure quality, ownership structure, and corporate diversiﬁcation on the stock price
performance of ﬁrms during the crisis, our analysis focuses on the eﬀects of connections.
[Insert Table 7 Here]
[Insert Table 8 Here]
6 Robustness Tests: Connections via the Board of Directors
As an extension on our ﬁndings, we examine the eﬀects of the connections with banks via
the board of directors on long term borrowing. We deﬁne the board connections in a similar
manner to Kroszner and Strahan (2001a). Speciﬁcally, a ﬁrm has connections with the bank
board when at least one member of the ﬁrm’s board also serves on the boards of banks and
ﬁnance companies. Out of 270 ﬁrms in the sample, 186 ﬁrms or 68.89 percent of the sample
have at least one incidence of the board connection with those of banks. On average, these ﬁrms
have connections with 1.79 banks, and the median number of banks that the ﬁrms connected
with is two.
We investigate further in order to examine the close relationships with banks that are eﬀected
through board representation at diﬀerent management levels. Our focus is on two management
levels, namely executives and non executives. An executive is deﬁned as someone who holds
one of the following positions: chairman, honorary chairman, vice-chairman, president, vice-
president, CEO or managing director, vice-CEO and vice managing director. Non-executives
are other directors of the board.
Our results reveal that the board connection appears to be most frequent at the non-
executive level, which accounts for about 36.30 percent of the ﬁrms. In 13 ﬁrms which accounts
for 4.81 percent of our sample, the ﬁrm’s board is connected with those of banks at the exec-
utives level. Finally, in about 28.15 percent of the ﬁrms, the board connections are via both
21the executive and non executive levels. We expect that top managers who are at the same time
serving at the boards of banks are likely to make it easier for their companies to get long term
loans.
6.1 Board Connections and Financing
In this Section, we examine the eﬀects of the board connections on corporate ﬁnancing using
similar methodology as in Section 5. First, we explore how the board connections aﬀect long
term lending. Table 9 shows the results of a univariate analysis comparing the ﬁnancing struc-
ture and ﬁrm characteristics between ﬁrms that are connected to banks through the board of
directors and those that are not. Similar to the previous ﬁndings, ﬁrms with the board con-
nections appear to use signiﬁcantly more long term loans but less short term loans compared
to non connected ﬁrms. The leverage ratio, however, measured by the ratio of total debt/total
assets for both connected and non connected ﬁrms are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
Regarding ﬁrm characteristics, ﬁrms with the board connections appear to be signiﬁcantly
larger than connected ﬁrms based on both the mean and median values of total assets and sales.
Connected ﬁrms do not appear to be more proﬁtable, but seem to be not more risky and have
less tangible assets compared to non connected ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, when considering the mean
values, connected ﬁrms appear to have higher risk measured by the standard deviation of sales
over 1991-95 compared to non connected ﬁrms. When considering the median values, connected
ﬁrms appear to have higher ﬁxed asset ratio compared to non connected ﬁrms.
Regressions relating the eﬀects of board connections on long term loans are shown in Ta-
ble 10. Industry dummies capturing the industry eﬀects are included in all regressions. Speci-
ﬁcation (1) and (2) focus on the eﬀect of the presence of any board connections between ﬁrms
and banks. The ratio of number of positions on the board that are connected with banks to
board size (Board connections/board size) captures this eﬀect. In Speciﬁcation (1), only the
industry eﬀects are included. In Speciﬁcation (2), we include all the ﬁrm characteristics vari-
ables described in Section 4.2. The results are consistent with our hypothesis and the previous
ﬁndings that connected ﬁrms appear to be able to obtain more long term loans. The estimated
coeﬃcients on Board connections/board size are positive as expected and strongly signiﬁcant.
The size of the coeﬃcient is 0.42 for the model (2) when ﬁrm characteristics are controlled in-
dicates that a 10 percent diﬀerence in board connection is associated with a 42 percent increase
in the long term debt ratio.
22We separate the board connections into three categories: Connections at the executive,
non executive and both executive, non executive levels. The results in speciﬁcation (3) show
that preferential access to long term loans to ﬁrms appears only when ﬁrms have strong board
connections with banks meaning that the connections have to be through both the executive and
non executive levels. The coeﬃcient on the connection variable is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent
level. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient is 0.107 indicating that ﬁrms with this type of board
connections, on average, an additional more long term debt of 10.7 percent.
Next, we investigate further whether the positive relationship between board connections and
the ratio of long term loans remains if we exclude ﬁrms that share common ultimate owners
with banks. By excluding ﬁrms where their controlling shareholders own banks and ﬁnance
companies, we are able to separate the eﬀects of the connections from the eﬀects of the bank
ownership. We repeat the regressions in Speciﬁcation (1), (2), and (3) but exclude 36 ﬁrms in
which the major shareholders own ﬁnancial institutions. We only report some of the results
here in Speciﬁcation (4). Other regressions are also consistent with the previous ﬁndings.
To understand whether board connections aﬀect the long term lending practices via ﬁrm
characteristics, we ran regressions using similar methodology in Table 5. None of the esti-
mated coeﬃcients on the interaction terms between the board connection variables and the ﬁrm
characteristics appears to be statistically signiﬁcant, however.
Further, we examine the eﬀects of the board connections on the total debt ratio. The re-
gression results relating the ratio of total debt to total assets are shown in Table 11. When
ﬁrm characteristic variables are not included, none of the estimated coeﬃcients on the board
connection variables is statistically signiﬁcant. However, when we control for the ﬁrm character-
istics, the coeﬃcient on the board connection variable, Board connections/board size, turns out
to be negative and signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. The results indicate that ﬁrms with board
connections have signiﬁcantly lower debt/asset ratios. In addition, the results also show that
ﬁrms that have board connections with banks both at the executive and non executive levels
have, on average, a lower debt/asset ratio of 7.1 percent than ﬁrms with no board connection
with banks.
Finally, it should be noted that the causality could also run from long term debt level
to board connections. More precisely, the positive relationship between the board connection
variables and long term debt level could indicate that the board connections are the outcome
of long term lending. Because we lack time series data on the board structure, we could
23not perform systematic tests to disentangle endogeneity and causality issues in order to draw
inferences about whether the board connections aﬀect long term lending.
[Insert Table 9 Here]
[Insert Table 10 Here]
[Insert Table 11 Here]
6.2 The Determinants of Board Connections
To test the robustness of our ﬁndings, we also investigate factors that determine the allocation
of board connections. This is in order to determine whether the presence of board connections
is a response to asymmetric information problems or is due to crony relationship or personal
connections. If such connections aﬀect the establishment of the board connections with banks,
then our board connection variable is indeed a good proxy for the crony or personal relationship.
Kroszner and Strahan (2001b) argue that the board connections might generate conﬂicts of
interests between creditors and borrowing ﬁrms especially when the ﬁrms are facing ﬁnancial
diﬃculties. The basic statement of this view is that when ﬁrms experience ﬁnancial distress,
either bankers who are sitting on the ﬁrms’ boards or directors of the borrowing ﬁrms who are
sitting on the banks’ boards tend to act on behalf of the ﬁrms. They are likely to put pressure
on banks to provide more loans to the ﬁrm. Since loans to troubled ﬁrms have a high probability
of default, these lending practices may in turn bankrupt the banks. Hence, banks are less likely
to have connections with unstable ﬁrms and more likely to establish connections with ﬁrms for
whom the potential for default is low. These ﬁrms are larger ﬁrms, with more tangible assets,
are more stable in term of proﬁtability, and have less leverage.
In contrast, the information view provides the opposite prediction. The ﬁrm-bank relation-
ship literature suggests that banks can learn a substantial amount of information about their
ﬁrm-customers via board representation. Besides, by sitting in a ﬁrm’s board, banks might
be able to closely monitor the behavior of ﬁrm management and may even inﬂuence decisions
made by the management. Since banks have such a wide access to private information about
the ﬁrms, the information asymmetries as well as the moral hazard problem might be mitigated.
Hence, this information view suggests that the beneﬁts of board connections from both the ﬁrm
and bank point of views depends on the potential information asymmetries and the agency
24costs of debt ﬁnancing between the ﬁrms and banks. Consistent with this view, ﬁrms that have
high agency costs and are diﬃcult to monitor should have connections with banks. That is,
smaller ﬁrms, ﬁrms with a lower proportion of tangible assets and less stable ﬁrms with stable
proﬁtability and higher fractions of leverage ratio are expected to be more likely to have the
board connections with banks.
The connection or crony view, however, leads to a diﬀerent prediction. If the banking system
is protected by implicit guarantees that provide insurance for banks from going bankrupt, the
conﬂicts of interests between banks and borrowing ﬁrms might be softened. Fully recognizing
that the government bears the costs of any ﬁnancial distress, banks may build board connections
with ﬁrms that are owned by their families and friends. In the extreme case, the connections
might be established irrespective of ﬁrm characteristic factors. In other words, the connection
view suggests that the connections might overwhelm the eﬀect of ﬁrm characteristics.
To explore this issue systematically, we follow the methodology used by Kroszner and Stra-
han (2001a and 2001b). We use a probit model in which the dependent variable is one if the
ﬁrm has at least one person on its board serving on a bank’s board or if the ﬁrm has a banker
on its board. The probit regression results on the determinants of the incidence of the board
connections are shown in Table 12. In Speciﬁcation (1), we test how board connections vary
with ﬁrm characteristics. The ﬁrm characteristics are the same set of variables described in
Section 4. The reported results are the marginal eﬀects of a one unit change from the mean of
each independent variable on the probability of having a board connection with banks.
Our results are partially in line with those of Kroszner and Strahan (2001a and 2001b).
Similar to the US banks, Thai banks also have the connections with larger ﬁrms. However,
unlike the US, asset tangibility, growth and sale volatility are not related to the probability of
having board connections. In addition, the connections are more prevalent for less indebted
ﬁrms. Overall, these results somewhat support the conﬂict of interest argument and reject the
information view.
Next, we investigate whether the existence of connections as well as ownership of banks
contributes to the incidence of board connections. In Speciﬁcation (2), we include two dummies
representing ﬁrms that are owned by the two groups of the inﬂuential families: Inﬂuential
families with bank and Inﬂuential families without bank. The estimated coeﬃcients of these
two dummy variables are strongly signiﬁcant at the one percent level. The results show that
connections are most prevalent among connected ﬁrms aﬃliated to these two groups of inﬂuential
25families. Further investigation on the data reveals that out of 65 ﬁrms that belong to the
inﬂuential families that do not own banks, only 6 ﬁrms do not have a board connection. Firms
that belong to the inﬂuential families who also own banks, however, are always connected to
the boards of banks. In most of the cases, the persons who serve on the boards of banks and
ﬁrms are the ﬁrms’ controlling shareholders and their families.
Interestingly, once we control for the eﬀects of connections by including the two proxies of
inﬂuential families, the incidence of board connections is hardly related to ﬁrm characteristics.
Except the measure for ﬁrm’s size, none of the estimated coeﬃcients on the rest of the ﬁrm
characteristics turn out to be statistically distinguishable from zero. These results are consistent
with the connection view, and do not appear to support the information view.
We investigate further to check whether the eﬀects of ﬁrm characteristics on the likelihood
of having the board connections is attenuated for the case of connected ﬁrms. To absolutely
distinguish the ownership eﬀect from the connection eﬀect, we examine ﬁrms that are aﬃliated
to the inﬂuential families that do not own banks. We interact the variable Inﬂuential families
without bank with the ﬁve ﬁrm characteristics. The results in Speciﬁcation (3) show that when
banks build a connection with non connected ﬁrms, banks appear to have board connections
with larger ﬁrms. In contrast, banks seem to pay less attention to ﬁrm’s size when they establish
a connection with the connected ﬁrms. Banks appear to have connections with ﬁrms that are
owned by inﬂuential families even if they are smaller.
To test the robustness of this ﬁndings, we drop 31 ﬁrms that are owned by the inﬂuential
families that own banks from our sample and re-estimate the probit model. Our results remain
the same (Speciﬁcation (4) and (5)). In an unreported regression, we ran a test that controls
for the size of the board. The regression was done by using the Tobit model, in which the
dependent variable is the ratio of the number of persons from a ﬁrm’s board who are serving on
the boards of banks divided by the number of persons in the ﬁrm’s board. Again, our results
are robust in term of signs, statistical signiﬁcance and magnitudes.
[Insert Table 12 Here]
6.3 Connected lending and Non-Performing Loans
One might argue that banks have incentives to provide more long term ﬁnancing to ﬁrms that
banks have close personal connections or board ties to because these connections help limit
26information asymmetry and moral hazard problems. Connected lending should therefore be
valuable both to the ﬁrms and banks. But, as noted in La Porta et al. (2003), if lending to
friends whom the banks know well improves information ﬂows, then such lending should end
up having lower or no default rates, or at worst have high recovery rates. Unfortunately, due to
data unavailability, we are not able to directly provide a systematic analysis of this issue. But
we believe that the evidence on the massive amount of non performing loans carried by banks
and ﬁnance companies, and which subsequently bankrupted a number of them is inconsistent
with the information view and arguably supports the connected lending view.
Panel A of Table 13 shows the proportion of non performing loans (NPLs) to outstanding
loans over 1997-2000. NPL is deﬁned as a loan that has stopped payment on principal and
interest for at least 3 months. The laxity in lending practices is demonstrated by the extremely
high levels of NPLs. The peak of the bad loan problem was in 1998 when the average ratio
of NPL to outstanding loans held by banks and ﬁnance companies reached 45.02 percent and
70.16 percent, respectively. It is widely believed, however, that the oﬃcial NPL ﬁgures tend to
understate the real extent of the problem. For example, while NPLs disclosed by Krung Thai
Bank, the second largest state owned bank, are 59 percent of outstanding loans, the ﬁgure that
was estimated by Pricewaterhouse Coopers who audited the bank is 84 percent (Bangkok Post,
November 9, 1999).
The bad loan problem has been an important contributory factor to the banking crisis that
started in 1997. As a consequence of this crisis a number of ﬁnancial institutions became insol-
vent. Panel B provides the number of ﬁnancial institutions from 1996-2001. The government
suspended 58 ﬁnance companies in August 1997, 12 ﬁnance companies and six commercial banks
in 1998, and one commercial banks and one ﬁnance company in 1999. Consolidations including
mergers reduced the number of local commercial banks from 15 at the end of 1996 to 13 by
2001. In sum, out of 14 domestic banks as of 1996, three were closed down, two were taken over
by the government and three became foreign owned banks. As for ﬁnance companies, out of 91
companies as of 1996, 71 were closed down.
[Insert Table 13 Here]
277 Conclusion
We have found that for Thai ﬁrms, the presence of close ties with banks and politicians was
associated with preferential access to long term debt prior to the Asian Crisis of 1997-98.
Furthermore, standard ﬁrm characteristics that the corporate ﬁnance literature suggests should
play a role, pale into insigniﬁcance in the presence of these connections. These ﬁndings are
consistent with the recent literature that implicates weak corporate governance in the extent
and severity of the crisis.
We believe our focus on corporate debt in Thailand is especially appropriate for examining
the role of connections in lending practices. Thailand was the ﬁrst casualty of the crisis, ex-
periencing the ﬁrst wave of serious speculative attacks on its currency in July of 1997 followed
by a sharp decline in its stock market, after which South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia and the
Philippines were aﬀected. Attempts to reconstruct the circumstances leading up to the crisis
(such as Corsetti et al. (1998a), Corsetti et al. (1998b), and Pomerleano (1998)) argue this was
not surprising since Thailand was the country with the shakiest macro-economic fundamentals
toward the end of 1996. Among the manifestations of weakness were large external deﬁcits,
increasing short-term foreign indebtedness and the fragile conditions of banks due to an accu-
mulation of bad loans. While Thailand provides perhaps the best laboratory for the testing of
the connections hypothesis in the shadow of the crisis, we are inclined to believe similar results
might be found in many other emerging economies.
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32Table 1: Ownership and Governance Structure of Thai Firms
This table presents ownership and governance structure of Thai ﬁrms based on our sample
and previous studies. Our sample (I) includes 270 non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms were listed in the Stock
Exchange of Thailand (SET) in 1996. The database of Khantavit et al. (2003) includes all
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms were listed in the SET in 1996. The results in Claessens et al. (I) (2000)
are based on the dataset of Claessens et al. (2000) but excluding ﬁnancial ﬁrms. The ﬁrms
in Our sample (II) are exactly the same ase in Claessens (I) et al. (2000). The results are
calculated based on our database. LB is the largest blockholders. Blockholders are persons who
have the same family name, their close relatives as well as ﬁrms that are owned and controlled
by them. Cash ﬂow rights leverage is the ratio of cash ﬂow rights to voting rights. % stands
for percentage. CS is controlling shareholder who owns at least 20% or 25% of the shares. In
Claessens et al. (2000), however, CS is deﬁned as a shareholder with at least 20% shareholdings.
CS alone is when there exists no other shareholder with shareholdings of at least 10%. SF and
MF are single and multiple families, respectively. MCS is when the ﬁrm has multiple controlling
shareholders. WHFF and WHNF are widely held ﬁnancial and non ﬁnancial ﬁrms, respectively.
FI is foreign investors. Pyramid is when a ﬁrm is controlled via other public ﬁrms. EXEC and
non EXEC are top executives and non executives, respectively.
Our sample Khantavit Claessens Claessens Our sample
(I) et al. et al. et al. (I) (II)
(2003) (2000) (2000)
I. Whole sample: No of ﬁrms 270 352 167 108 108
Mean LB cash ﬂow rights 39.58 39.23 32.84 36.87 40.35
Mean LB voting rights 42.68 42.07 35.25 38.96 42.52
Mean LB cash ﬂow rights leverage 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.94
% of ﬁrms with CS (25% cut-oﬀ) 79.63 78.69 n.a. 85.2 79.6
% of ﬁrms with CS (20% cut-oﬀ) 89.63 88.35 96.05 95.4 90.7
CS alone 60.74 57.95 40.10 10.19 58.33
II. Firms with CS (25% cut-oﬀ)
% of ﬁrms controlled by SF (A) 53.71 51.14 n.a. n.a. 42.6
% of ﬁrms controlled by MF (B) 5.56 5.97 n.a. n.a. 7.4
A + B 59.27 57.11 61.60 58.33 50.00
% of ﬁrms controlled by MCS 4.81 5.68 n.a. n.a. 7.4
% of ﬁrms controlled by state 1.85 2.27 8 7.4 5.6
% of ﬁrms contolled by WHFF 0.37 0.57 0 3.7 0.0
% of ﬁrms controlled by WHF 0 0 15.3 15.7 0.0
% of ﬁrms controlled by FI 13.33 13.07 0 0 16.7
% of ﬁrms with pyramids 20 23.47 12.7 6.5 25.9
% of ﬁrms with CS as EXEC 78.7 68.95 67.5 43.5 52.8
% of ﬁrms with CS as non EXEC 76.4 65.7 n.a.
Mean CS cash ﬂow rights 45.55 44.66 n.a. 40.21 47.85
Mean CS voting rights 48.74 47.75 n.a. 42.35 50.76
Mean CS cash ﬂow rights leverage 0.93 0.931 n.a. 0.96 0.95
Mean EXEC ownership (non CS) 1.75 2.26 n.a.
Mean non EXEC ownership (non CS) 3.24 3.18 n.a.
33Table 2: Connected Families
This table shows the top 60 most wealthy families in Thailand. The ranking is based on the
business group ranking of by Suehiro (2000). The size of each group is calculated by summing
up sales of all ﬁrms in the same group that appear in in the largest thousand ﬁrms in 1994.
Rank Group Owner Rank Group Owner
(Family name) (Family name)
1 Siam Cement Crown Property
Bureau
31 Laemthong Khanathanawanit
2 Bangkok Bank Sophonpanich 32 The Mall Umput
3 CP Chiarawanon 33 Ocean Insurance Assakun
4 Thai Farmer Bank Lamsam 34 Sarasin Sarasin
5 Siam Pornprapha 35 Asia Uachukiat
6 Boon Rawd Brewery Piromphakdi 36 Wanglee Wanglee, Poon
Phol
7 TCC Siriwattanapakdi 37 UCOM Bencharongkun
8 Saha Chokwattana 38 Sukree Pothirattanangkul
9 Thonburi Phanich Wiriyaphan 39 Betagro Taepaisitphongse
10 Sittipol Lee-issaranukun 40 Kamol Sukosol Sukosol
11 Ayutthaya Ratanarak 41 Sino-Thai Charnwirakul
12 Metro Laohathai 42 Yontrakit Lee-nutaphong
13 Osotsapa Osathanukhro 43 Metro Mechinery Buraphachaisri
14 Srifuengfung Srifuengfung 44 Unicord Konutakiat
15 Central Chirathiwat 45 P Charoen Pan Sirimongkonkasem
16 TPI Liaophairat 46 Kan Yong Phothiworakun
17 Ital-Thai Kannasut 47 Srithai Loetsumitkun
18 Saha-Union Darakanon 48 Suraphon Suraphon
19 Taechaphaibun Taechaphaibun 49 Siam Steel Kunanantakul
20 Shinnawatra Shinnawatra 50 NTS Horungruang
21 Sahaviriya Wiriyaphraphaikit 51 Capital Rice Wanitchakwong
22 Siam Steel Pipe Leesawattrakun 52 Siam Chemical Ratanarat
23 SP International Phornprapha 53 Thai Fisheries
24 Soon Hua Seng Damnoencharnwanit54 Chinteik Brothers Nganthawi
25 Land and House Assawaphokhin 55 Sirithepthai Trichakraphop
26 Yip In Tsoi Yip In Tsoi,
Chutrakul
56 Thai Rung Ruang Assadathorn
27 Thai Life Insurance Chaiyawan 57 Mitr Phol Wongkusonkit
28 Thai Summit Jungrungruenkit 58 Krisda Mahanakorn Krisdathanon
29 Bangkok Land Kanchanapat 59 Dusit Thani Piyaoui
30 Thai Union Charnsiri 60 Rattanapaitoon Rattakun
34Table 3: Financing and Firm Characteristics: Connected Families
This table presents mean values for a set of ﬁrm characteristics, as measured in 1996. Top 60,
Top 30, and Top 20 refer to ﬁrms that are aﬃliations of the top 60, top 30, and top 20 most
wealthy families. NC refers to ﬁrms that are not connected to those families. S-T loans is
short term borrowing from banks and ﬁnance companies. L-T loans is long term borrowing
from banks and ﬁnance companies. S-T portion of L-T loans is long term debt that is due in
this period. Total debt is the summation of S-T loans, L-T loans, S-T portion of L-T loans
and debentures. EBIT/total assets and EBIT/sales are the ratio of earnings before interest
and taxes to total assets and sales, respectively. M-B ratio is the ratio of the market to the
book values of total assets. Fixed asset ratio is the ratio of net ﬁxed assets to total assets.
S.D.(sales) is the S.D. of the percentage changes in sales over the period 1991-1995. Sale
growth is the average annual growth in sales over the period 1992-96. Age is the number of
years since incorporation. Total assets and sales are in billion Baht. Mean diﬀerences are tested
using the t-test. ¤, ¤¤, ¤¤¤ indicate statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence when compared with ﬁrms
connected to most wealthy families the at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Top 60 NC Top 30 NC Top 20 NC
Financing Structure
Total liabilities/total assets 0.562 0.542 0.550 0.548 0.547 0.549
Total debt/total assets 0.390 0.414 0.365 0.421¤¤ 0.360 0.420¤¤
S-T loans/total assets 0.179 0.242¤¤¤ 0.159 0.243¤¤¤ 0.156 0.239¤¤¤
S-T portion of L-T loans/total
assets
0.041 0.036 0.036 0.038 0.037 0.038
Debentures/Total assets 0.024 0.023 0.019 0.025 0.016 0.025
L-T loans/Total assets 0.146 0.114¤ 0.152 0.115¤¤ 0.150 0.118¤
Trade credits/total assets 0.086 0.065¤¤ 0.093 0.065¤¤¤ 0.097 0.065¤¤¤
Debt maturity structure
S-T loans/total debt 0.510 0.622¤¤¤ 0.501 0.615¤¤ 0.493 0.612¤¤¤
S-T portion of L-T loans/total
debt
0.104 0.080¤ 0.098 0.085 0.104 0.083
Debentures/total debt 0.047 0.042 0.040 0.045 0.037 0.045
L-T Loans /Total debt 0.339 0.256¤¤ 0.361 0.256¤¤¤ 0.366 0.260¤¤¤
Firm characteristics
Total assets 13.300 4.090¤¤¤ 14.50 4.53¤¤¤ 15.20 4.839¤¤¤
Sales 6.404 2.12¤¤¤ 7.124 2.25¤¤¤ 7.819 2.307¤¤¤
EBIT/total assets 0.084 0.072 0.084 0.073 0.095 0.070¤
EBIT/sales 0.143 0.125 0.143 0.127 0.153 0.125
M-B ratio 1.158 1.183 1.208 1.163 1.244 1.155
Fixed asset ratio 0.409 0.424 0.400 0.426 0.412 0.421
Cash/total assets 0.017 0.027¤¤ 0.015 0.026¤¤ 0.015 0.026¤
Liquid asset ratio 0.433 0.458 0.419 0.461 0.417 0.459
Sale growth (1992-96) 0.351 0.246¤ 0.356 0.253¤ 0.337 0.265
S.D. (salea 1991-95) 0.480 0.343¤¤¤ 0.472 0.358 0.422 0.378
Age 23.618 19.740¤ 24.634 19.729¤¤ 25.900 19.624¤¤
No. of ﬁrms 89 181 71 199 60 210
35Table 4: The Eﬀects of Connections on Long Term Loans
The regression is based on a sample of 270 publicly traded ﬁrms in 1996. The dependent variable
is long-term loans divided by total debt. Connected ﬁrms indicates if the ﬁrm is owned by one
of the top 60, 30, and 20 most wealthy families. Log (assets) is the logarithm of the book
values of total assets. M-B ratio is the ratio of the market to the book values of total assets.
Fixed asset ratio is the ratio of net ﬁxed assets to total assets. S.D. (sales 91-95) is the S.D.
of the percentage changes in sales over the period 1991-1995. The regression method is the
OLS. Each speciﬁcation includes a set of 21 industry dummies but the results are suppressed.
t statistics are shown in parentheses. ¤, ¤¤, ¤¤¤ indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent
levels, respectively.
Top 60 Top 30 Top 20
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Connected ﬁrms 0.092¤¤¤ 0.061¤ 0.130 ¤¤¤ 0.105 ¤¤¤ 0.145 ¤¤¤ 0.107 ¤¤
(2.65) (1.78) (3.48) (2.78) (3.48) (2.49)
Log (assets) 0.066 ¤¤¤ 0.061 ¤¤¤ 0.062 ¤¤¤
(4.55) (4.16) (4.23)
M-B ratio 0.000 -0.003 -0.006
-(0.02) -(0.14) -(0.26)
Fixed asset ratio 0.289 ¤¤¤ 0.300 ¤¤¤ 0.284 ¤¤¤
(2.69) (2.86) (2.62)
Total liabilities/assets 0.027 0.048 0.046
(0.28) (0.50) (0.48)
S.D. (sales 1991-95) -0.021 -0.022 -0.019
-(1.09) -(1.21) -(1.08)
Intercept 0.185 ¤¤¤ -0.872 0.185 -0.824 0.183 ¤¤¤ -0.822 ¤¤¤
(4.260) -(4.22) (4.44) ¤¤¤ -(3.95) (4.39) -(3.96)
F-statistic 4.48 7.52 4.84 8.08 4.78 8.06
Prob (F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adjusted R-squared 0.271 0.371 0.286 0.384 0.288 0.381
N 270 270 270 270 270
36Table 5: Connection and Long Term Debt
The regression is based on a sample of 270 publicly traded ﬁrms in 1996. The dependent variable
is long-term loans divided by total debt. Connected ﬁrms indicates if the ﬁrm is owned by one
of the top 60, 30, and 20 richest families. Log (assets is the logarithm of the book values of
total assets. M-B ratio is the ratio of the market to the book values of total assets. Fixed
asset ratio is the ratio of net ﬁxed assets to total assets. S.D. (sales 91-95) is the S.D. of
the percentage changes in sales over the period 1991-1995. The regression method is the OLS.
Each speciﬁcation includes a set of 21 industry dummies but the results are suppressed. Robust
standard errors are shown in parentheses. ¤, ¤¤, ¤¤¤ indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1
percent levels, respectively.
Independent Variable Top 60 Top 30 Top 20
(1) (2) (3)
Connect ﬁrms * Log (assets) -0.002 0.015 0.030
-(0.08) (0.49) (0.79)
Connect ﬁrms * M-B ratio 0.030 0.039 0.003
(0.50) (0.61) (0.72)
Connected ﬁrms * Fixed asset ratio -0.397 ¤¤¤ -0.333 ¤¤¤ -0.027 ¤¤¤
-(2.62) -(1.92) -(2.23)
Connected ﬁrms * Total liabilities/assets 0.059 0.225 0.021
(0.26) (0.95) (1.20)
Connected ﬁrms * S.D. (sales 1991-95) 0.020 0.031 0.030
(0.50) (0.78) (0.70)
Connected ﬁrms 0.182 -0.179 -0.434
(0.45) -(0.42) -(0.92)
Log (assets) 0.071 ¤¤¤ 0.056 ¤¤¤ 0.051 ¤¤¤
(3.58) (2.71) (2.69)
M-B ratio -0.006 -0.009 -0.014
-(0.25) -(0.41) -(0.60)
Fixed asset ratio 0.436 ¤¤¤ 0.379 ¤¤¤ 0.365 ¤¤¤
(3.83) (3.57) (3.22)
Total liabilities/assets 0.023 0.023 0.026
(0.23) (0.23) (0.27)
S.D. (sales 1991-95) -0.038 -0.043 ¤¤ -0.043 ¤¤
-(1.27) -(2.04) -(2.45)
Intercept -0.999 ¤¤¤ -0.761 ¤¤¤ -0.692 ¤¤
-(3.51) -(2.59) -(2.53)
F-statistic 7.11 6.9 7.36
Prob (F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adjusted R-squared 0.395 0.407 0.418
N 270 270 270
37Table 6: Regression: Connections and Total Debt
The regression is based on a sample of 270 publicly traded ﬁrms in 1996. The dependent
variable is total debt divided by total assets. Connected ﬁrms indicates if the ﬁrm is owned
by one of the top 60, 30, and 20 richest families. Log (assets) is the logarithm of the book
values of total assets. M-B ratio is the ratio of the market to the book values of total assets.
Fixed asset ratio is the ratio of net ﬁxed assets to total assets. S.D. (sales 91-95) is the S.D.
of the percentage changes in sales over the period 1991-1995. The regression method is the
OLS. Each speciﬁcation includes a set of 21 industry dummies but the results are suppressed.
t statistics are shown in parentheses. ¤, ¤¤, ¤¤¤ indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent
levels, respectively.
Top 60 Top 30 Top 20
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Connected ﬁrms -0.034 -0.059 ¤¤¤ -0.055 ¤¤ -0.086 ¤¤¤ -0.058 ¤¤ -0.085 ¤¤¤
-(1.46) -(2.71) -(2.19) -(3.69) -(2.07) -(3.23)
Log (asset) 0.085 ¤¤¤ 0.087 ¤¤¤ 0.087 ¤¤¤
(9.81) (10.13) (10.01)
M-B ratio -0.023 -0.020 -0.019
-(1.45) -(1.26) -(1.18)
Fixed asset ratio -0.034 -0.043 -0.028
-(0.64) -(0.84) -(0.55)
S.D. (sales 1991-95) -0.028 ¤¤¤ -0.028 ¤¤¤ -0.030 ¤¤¤
-(3.05) -(2.75) -(3.17)
EBIT/total assets -0.460 ¤¤¤ -0.471 ¤¤¤ -0.447 ¤¤¤
-(4.79) -(5.04) -(4.57)
Intercept -0.638 ¤¤¤ -0.664 ¤¤¤ -0.663 ¤¤¤
-(4.83) -(5.09) -(5.03)
F-statistic 4.78 9.42 5.05 9.48 4.68 9.55
Prob (F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adjusted R-squared 0.200 0.444 0.207 0.458 0.2061 0.452
N 270 270 270 270 270 270
38Table 7: Connections and The Impact of the Financial Crisis
This table presents median values of the Coverage ratio and EBT/total assets, as measured in
1997. Coverage ratio is deﬁned as the ratio of interest expenses to earnings before interest and
taxes. EBT/total assets is the ratio of earnings before taxes to total assets. Top 60, Top 30,
and Top 20 refer to ﬁrms that are aﬃliations of the top 60, top 30, and top 20 most wealthy
families. NC refers to ﬁrms that are not connected to those families. Median diﬀerences are
tested using the Wilcoxon signed rank test. ¤, ¤¤, ¤¤¤ indicate statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence
when compared with ﬁrms connected to most wealthy families at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels,
respectively.
Top 60 NC Top 30 NC Top 20 NC
Coverage ratio (COV) 1.47 1.15 1.54 1.09 ¤¤ 1.63 1.04 ¤¤
Percentage of ﬁrms with COV < 1 40.23 48.04 38.57 47.96 35.59 48.31
EBT/assets (%) 1.55 0.28 ¤ 1.86 0.26 ¤¤ 2.19 0.24 ¤¤
No. of ﬁrms 87 179 70 196 59 207
Table 8: Performance Connected Firms after the Financial Crisis
The regression is based on a sample of 267 publicly traded ﬁrms in 1997. The dependent
variable is the ratio of earnings before taxes to total assets. Connected ﬁrms indicates if the
ﬁrm is owned by one of the top 60, 30, and 20 richest families. Log (assets) is the logarithm of
the book values of total assets. The regression method is the OLS. Each speciﬁcation includes a
set of 21 industry dummies but the results are suppressed. t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
¤, ¤¤, ¤¤¤ indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Top 60 Top 30 Top 20
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Connected ﬁrms 0.042 ¤¤ 0.017 0.043 ¤¤ 0.011 0.070 ¤¤¤ 0.040 ¤¤
(2.19) (1.00) (2.06) (0.62) (3.36) (2.21)
Log (assets) 0.022 ¤¤ 0.022 ¤¤ 0.020 ¤¤
(2.220) (2.250) (2.020)
Total liabilities/total assets -0.158 ¤¤ -0.158 ¤¤ -0.156 ¤¤
-(2.220) -(2.220) -(2.200)
Intercept -0.012 -0.014 -0.003
-(0.160) -(0.180) -(0.040)
F-statistic 1.68 1.680 1.58 1.600 1.870 1.990
Prob (F-statistic) 0.03 0.028 0.05 0.043 0.010 0.00
Adjusted R-squared 0.0778 0.298 0.077 0.297 0.09 0.304
N 267 267 267 267 267 267
39Table 9: Financial and Firm Characteristics: Board Connections
This table presents mean and median values for a set of ﬁrm characteristics, as measured in
1996. The data includes 187 ﬁrms that have at least one board member has a seat on the
board of a bank, and 83 ﬁrms that have no such connection. S-T loans is short term borrowing
from banks and ﬁnance companies. L-T loans is long term borrowing from banks and ﬁnance
companies. S-T portion of L-T debt is long term debt that is due in this period. Total debt is
the summation of S-T loans, L-T loans, S-T portion of L-T loans and debentures. EBIT/total
assets and EBIT/sales are the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets and
sales, respectively. M-B ratio is the ratio of the market to the book values of total assets.
Fixed asset ratio is the ratio of net ﬁxed assets to total assets. S.D.(sales) is the S.D. of the
percentage changes in sales over the period 1991-1995. Sale growth is the average annual growth
in sales over the period 1992-96. Age is the number of years since incorporation. Total assets
and sales are in million Baht. Mean and median diﬀerences are tested using the t-test and
the Wilcoxon signed rank test, respectively. ¤, ¤¤, ¤¤¤ indicate statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence
when compared with connected ﬁrms at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Mean Median
Connect Not connect Connect Not connect
Financial characteristics
Total liabilities/total assets 0.554 0.536 0.580 0.563
Total debt/total assets 0.405 0.409 0.433 0.428
S-T loans/total assets 0.201 0.266¤¤¤ 0.167 0.262¤¤¤
S-T portion of L-T loans/total assets 0.039 0.033 0.025 0.018¤
Debentures/Total assets 0.027 0.015 0.000 0.000
L-T loans/Total assets 0.138 0.095¤¤ 0.106 0.061¤¤
Trade credits/total assets 0.071 0.074 0.045 0.056
Debt maturity structure
S-T loans/total debt 0.544 0.677¤¤¤ 0.578 0.760¤¤¤
S-T portion of L-T loans/total debt 0.095 0.071¤ 0.067 0.043¤¤
Debentures/total debt 0.048 0.032 0.000 0.000
L-T loans/Total debt 0.312 0.22¤¤ 0.28 0.41¤¤
Firm characteristics
Total assets 9,192.3 2,517.8¤¤¤ 3,381.8 1,512.7¤¤¤
Sales 4,261.6 1,886.7¤¤ 1,758.7 1,209.3¤¤¤
EBIT/total assets 0.046 0.036 0.042 0.048
EBIT/sales 0.048 0.037 0.070 0.062
M-B ratio 1.190 1.140 0.973 0.977
Fixed asset ratio 0.406 0.449 0.367 0.422¤
Cash/total assets 0.021 0.029¤ 0.009 0.017¤¤¤
Liquid asset ratio 0.443 0.466 0.456 0.462
Sale growth 0.305 0.226 0.162 0.166
S.D. (sales 1991-95) 0.434 0.284¤ 0.175 0.152
Age 21.107 20.819 17 17
40Table 10: Board Connection Regression
The regression is based on a sample of 270 publicly traded ﬁrms in 1996. The dependent variable
is long-term loans divided by total debt. Board connections is the number of persons on the
ﬁrm board that are also sitting on the board of banks. Bankers as executives and Bankers as
non executives are dummy variables, taking the value of 1 if there exits at least one member
from the board of banks acting as top executive and non executive of the ﬁrm, respectively. At
both levels indicates the case when the board connections are from both levels. Log (assets) is
the logarithm of the book values of total assets. M-B ratio is the ratio of the market to the book
values of total assets. Fixed asset ratio is the ratio of net ﬁxed assets to total assets. S.D. (sales
92-95) is the S.D. of the percentage changes in sales over the period 1991-1995. The regression
method is the OLS. Each speciﬁcation includes a set of 21 industry dummies but the results
are suppressed. textitt-statistics are shown in parentheses. ¤, ¤¤, ¤¤¤ indicate signiﬁcance at the
10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Board connections/Board size 0.422 ¤¤¤ 0.215 ¤¤ 0.293 ¤¤¤
(4.450) (0.109) (0.118)
At executive level -0.006
(0.077)
At non executive level 0.032
(0.034)
At both levels 0.107 ¤¤¤
(0.041)
Log (assets) 0.059 ¤¤¤ 0.050 ¤¤¤ 0.058 ¤¤¤
(0.015) (0.016) (0.018)
M-B ratio -0.005 -0.002 0.008
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Fixed asset ratio 0.266 ¤¤ 0.304 ¤¤¤ 0.240 ¤¤
(0.114) (0.108) (0.126)
Total liabilities/assets 0.022 0.047 -0.017
(0.094) (0.098) (0.095)
S.D. (sales 1991-95) -0.016 -0.019 -0.021
(0.020) (0.022) (0.019)
Intercept -0.763 ¤¤¤ -0.677 ¤¤¤ -0.724 ¤¤¤
(0.217) (0.222) (0.268)
F-statistic 6.09 7.13 6.90 7.940
Prob (F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adjusted R-squared 0.284 0.351 0.362 0.365
N 270 270 270 234
41Table 11: The Eﬀects of Board Connections on Total Debt Ratio
The regression is based on a sample of 270 publicly traded ﬁrms in 1996. The dependent variable
is total debt divided by total assets. Board connections is the number of persons on the ﬁrm
board that are also sitting on the board of banks. Bankers as executives and Bankers as non
executives are dummy variables, taking the value of 1 if there exits at least one member from
the board of banks acting as top executive and non executive of the ﬁrm, respectively. At both
levels indicates the case when the board connections are from both levels. Log (assets) is the
logarithm of the book values of total assets. M-B ratio is the ratio of the market to the book
values of total assets. Fixed asset ratio is the ratio of net ﬁxed assets to total assets. S.D. (sales
92-95) is the S.D. of the percentage changes in sales over the period 1991-1995. The regression
method is the OLS. Each speciﬁcation includes a set of 21 industry dummies but the results
are suppressed. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ¤, ¤¤, ¤¤¤ indicate signiﬁcance at the 10,
5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Board connections/Board size -0.015 -0.180 ¤¤
-(0.17) -(2.36)
At executive level 0.010 -0.015
(0.24) -(0.43)
At non executive level -0.007 -0.027
-(0.240) -(1.140)
At both levels 0.008 -0.071 ¤¤¤
(0.25) -(2.63)
Log (assets) 0.086 ¤¤¤ 0.090 ¤¤¤
(10.08) (10.50)
M-B ratio -0.021 -0.023
-(1.38) -(1.47)
Fixed asset ratio -0.017 -0.046
-(0.32) -(0.87)
S.D. (sales 1991-95) -0.033 ¤¤¤ -0.029 ¤¤¤
-(3.34) -(3.02)
EBIT/total assets -0.476 ¤¤¤ -0.477 ¤¤¤
-(4.84) -(4.90)
Intercept 0.498 -0.661 ¤¤¤ 0.497 ¤¤¤ -0.690 ¤¤¤
(15.19) -(5.05) (13.32) -(5.34)
F-statistic 4.41 9.6 4.17 9.54
Prob (F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adjusted R-squared 0.194 0.439 0.195 0.444
N 270 270 270 270
42Table 12: The Determinants of Board Connections
The estimation method is Probit. The coeﬃcients presented are the marginal eﬀects of a one
unit change from the mean of each independent variable on the probability of having a board
connection with banks. The independent variable is one if the ﬁrm has at least one member from
the board of banks acting as director or top executive of the ﬁrm, has at least one person on its
board sitting on those of banks in 1996, and zero otherwise. Mean of the dependent variable is
0.69. M-B ratio is the ratio of the market to the book values of total assets. Fixed asset ratio
is the ratio of net ﬁxed assets to total assets. Connected families with banks indicates if the the
ﬁrm belongs to one of the top 60 richest families and its major shareholder also owns at least
one bank or ﬁnance company. Connected families without banks indicates if the ﬁrm belongs to
one of the top 60 richest families and its major shareholder does not own any bank or ﬁnance
company. S.D. (sales 91-95) is the S.D. of the percentage changes in sales over the period
1991-1995. The regression method is the OLS. Each speciﬁcation includes a set of 21 industry
dummies but the results are suppressed. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ¤,
¤¤, ¤¤¤ indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log (assets) 0.163 ¤¤¤ 0.134 ¤¤¤ 0.170 ¤¤¤ 0.134 ¤¤¤ 0.172 ¤¤¤
(0.036) (0.036) (0.051) (0.042) (0.058)
M-B ratio 0.024 0.035 0.026 0.040 0.047
(0.051) (0.049) (0.045) (0.055) (0.052)
Fixed asset ratio -0.130 -0.126 -0.022 -0.126 -0.028
(0.168) (0.167) (0.147) (0.189) (0.171)
Total liabilities/assets -0.367 ¤ -0.280 -0.416 ¤¤ -0.267 -0.368 ¤
(0.212) (0.206) (0.206) (0.235) (0.227)
S.D. (sales 1991-95) 0.049 0.043 0.022 0.062 0.024
(0.062) (0.068) (0.062) (0.081) (0.077)
Connected families without banks 0.266 ¤¤¤ 0.988 ¤¤¤ 0.318 ¤¤¤ 0.996 ¤¤¤
(0.053) (0.030) (0.065) (0.012)
Connected families with banks 0.277 ¤¤¤
(0.043)
Connected families * Log (assets) -0.238 ¤¤¤ -0.238 ¤¤¤
(0.079) (0.087)
Connected families * M-B ratio -0.052 -0.075
(0.110) (0.122)
Connected families * Fixed asset ratio -0.156 -0.116
(0.341) (0.382)
Connected families * Total liabilities/assets 0.516 0.390
(0.504) (0.550)
Connected families * S.D. (sales 1991-95) 0.996 1.004
(0.463) (0.519)
Prob > Chi-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pseudo R squared 0.150 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.23
N 270 270 270 234 234
43Table 13: The Thai Financial System
The information of this table is obtained from the Bank of Thailand. Panel A presents non
performing loans held by each category of ﬁnancial institutions. Panel B presents the number
of ﬁnancial institutions over the period of 1996-2001. Non performing loans and the number of
ﬁnancial institutions are measured at the end of each year. Non performing loan is a loan that
has stopped payment on principal and interest for at least 3 months. Financial institutions are
classiﬁed by the ownership following the deﬁnition of the Bank of Thailand. They include both
publicly and non publicly traded ﬁnancial institutions.
Panel A: Non performing loans
Financial Institution 1997 1998 1999 2000
1. Total commercial banks 19.77 45.02 38.57 17.70
1.1 Private banks (domestic) 19.36 40.48 30.59 18.00
1.2 State owned Banks 29.33 62.45 62.84 21.63
1.3 Foreign banks 1.87 9.81 9.94 6.60
2. Finance companies 33.28 70.16 49.22 24.48
Panel B: Number of ﬁnancial institutions during 1996-2000
Financial Institution 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Domestic private banks 14 14 9 9 9 9
State owned banks 1 1 4 4 4 4
Foreign banks 14 14 13 20 20 17
Finance companies 91 35 36 21 20 20
Total 120 64 62 54 53 50
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